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1 Introduction
Over the last few years, there has been an increasing interest in quantum cryptog-
raphy. On one hand, many cryptographic schemes based on quantum information
have been proposed, among which the most well-known result is quantum key
distribution (OKD) [1]. These schemes take full advantage of the novel properties
of quantum information and aims to realize functionalities that do not exist us-
ing classical information alone. On the other hand, the development of quantum
computing threatens many classical cryptosystems. The most representative ex-
ample is Shor’s algorithm [22]. By using Shor’s algorithm, an adversary who owns
a quantum computer can break the security of any schemes based on factorization
or discrete logarithm, such as RSA. This has greatly motivated the development of
post-quantum cryptography, i.e., classical cryptosystems that remain secure even
when the adversary owns a quantum computer.
While currently used public-key cryptography suffers from a severe threat due
to Shor’s algorithm, the impact of quantum computers on symmetric-key cryp-
tography is still less understood. Since Grover’s algorithm provides a quadratic
speed-up for general search problems, the key lengths of symmetric-key cryptosys-
tems need to be doubled to maintain the security. In addition, Simon’s algorithm
[23] has also been applied to cryptanalysis. Kuwakado and Morii use it to con-
struct a quantum distinguisher for 3-round Feistel scheme [14] and recover partial
key of Even-Mansour construction [15]. Santoli and Schaffiner extend their result
and present a quantum forgery attack on CBC-MAC scheme [21]. In [11], Kaplan
et al. use Simon’s algorithm to attack various symmetric cryptosystems, such as
CBC-MAC, PMAC, CLOC and so on. They also study how differential and linear
cryptanalysis behave in the post-quantum world [12]. In addition to Simon’s algo-
rithm, Bernstein-Vazirani (BV) algorithm [2] has also been used for cryptanalysis.
Li and Yang proposed two methods to execute quantum differential cryptanalysis
based on BV algorithm in [17], but in their attack, it is implicitly assumed that
the attacker can query the function which maps the plaintext to the input of the
last round of the encryption algorithm.
In this paper, we study applications of BV algorithm and use it to attack block
ciphers. It has been found that running BV algorithm on a Boolean function f
without performing the final measurement will gives a superposition of all states
|ω〉 (ω ∈ {0, 1}n), and the amplitude corresponding to each |ω〉 is its Walsh spec-
trum Sf (ω) [8,10]. In addition, there is a link between the linear structure of a
Boolean function and its Walsh spectrum [6]. Based on these two facts, Li and
Yang present a quantum algorithm to find the linear structures of a Boolean func-
tion in [16]. We modify their algorithm so that it can find the linear structures of
a vector function. Our attack strategies are all built on this modified algorithm.
Attack model. In this paper, we only consider quantum chosen message at-
tack that has been studied in [3,5,9]. In this attack model, the adversary is granted
the access to a quantum oracle which computes the encryption function in su-
perposition. Specifically, if the encryption algorithm is described by a classical
function Ek : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, then the adversary can make quantum queries∑
x,y |x〉|y〉 →
∑
x,y |x〉|y ⊕ Ek(x)〉.
Our contributions. In this article, we present several methods to attack block
ciphers. We first propose a quantum algorithm for finding the linear structures of
a vector function, which takes BV algorithm as a subroutine and is developed
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from the algorithm in [16]. Then we modify this original algorithm to get different
versions and apply them in different attack strategies. In more detail, our main
contributions are as follows:
• We construct new quantum distinguishers for the 3-round Feistel scheme and
propose a new quantum algorithm to recover partial key of Even-Mansour con-
struction. Our methods are similar with the ones proposed by Kuwakado and
Morii [14,15], but we use BV algorithm instead of Simon’s algorithm. Although
this modification cause a slight increase in complexity, it makes our methods has
more general applications. For example, by constructing functions that have differ-
ent linear structures, we can obtain various distinguishers for the 3-round Feistel
scheme. The essential reason is that using BV algorithm can find not only the
periods of a function but also its other linear structures.
• Observing that linear structures of a encryption function are actually high proba-
bility differentials of it, we propose three ways to execute differential cryptanalysis,
which we call quantum differential analysis, quantum small probability differen-
tial cryptanalysis and quantum impossible differential cryptanalysis respectively.
Afterwards, we analyze the efficiency and success probability of all attacks. The
quantum algorithms used for these three kinds of differential cryptanalysis all
have polynomial running time. As we know, one of the main shortcomings of tra-
ditional differential cryptanalysis is the difficulties in extending the differential
paths, which limits the number of rounds that can be attacked. Our approach
avoids this problem since it treats the encryption function as a whole.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly recall a few notations and results about the linear struc-
ture. Let n be a positive integer and F2 = {0, 1} be a finite field of characteristic
2. Fn2 = {0, 1}n is a vector space over F2. The set of all functions from Fn2 to F2 is
denoted as Bn.
Definition 1 A vector a ∈ Fn2 is called a linear structure of a Boolean function
f ∈ Bn, if
f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = f(a) + f(0), ∀x ∈ Fn2 ,
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-or.
For any f ∈ Bn, let Uf be the set of all linear structures of f , and
U if = {a ∈ Fn2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i,∀x ∈ F2n}, i = 0, 1.
Obviously, Uf = U
0
f ∪ U1f . For any a ∈ Fn2 and i = 0, 1, let
V if,a = {x ∈ Fn2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}.
Clearly, 0 ≤ |V if,a|/2n ≤ 1, and a ∈ U if if and only if |V if,a|/2n = 1. For any a ∈ Fn2 ,
1− |V if,a|/2n quantifies how close a is to be a linear structure of f . Naturally, we
give the following definition:
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Definition 2 A vector a ∈ Fn2 is called a σ-close linear structure of a function
f ∈ Bn, if there exists i ∈ {0, 1} such that
1− |{x ∈ F
n
2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|
2n
< σ.
If a is a σ(n)-close linear structure of f for some negligible function σ(n), we
call it a quasi linear structure of f .
Relative differential uniformity of a Boolean function quantifies how close the
function is from having a nontrivial linear structure, which is defined in [20]:
Definition 3 The relative differential uniformity of f ∈ Bn is defined as
δf =
1
2n
max
06=a∈Fn2
max
i∈F2
|{x ∈ Fn2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|.
For any f ∈ Bn, it is obviously that 12 ≤ δf ≤ 1, and Uf 6= {0} if and only if
δf = 1. The linear structures of a Boolean function is closely related to its Walsh
spectrum, which is defined as follows:
Definition 4 The Walsh spectrum of a Boolean function f ∈ Bn is defined as
Sf (ω) =
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)+ω·x.
The relation between the linear structure and Walsh spectral is captured by
following two lemmas, which have been proved in [19].
Lemma 1 Let f ∈ Bn, then ∀a ∈ Fn2 , ∀i ∈ F2,∑
ω·a=i
S2f (ω) =
|V if,a|
2n
=
|{x ∈ Fn2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|
2n
.
Lemma 2 For f ∈ Bn, let Nf = {ω ∈ Fn2 |Sf (ω) 6= 0}. Then ∀i ∈ {0, 1}, it holds
that
U if = {a ∈ Fn2 |ω · a = i,∀ ω ∈ Nf}.
Lemma 2 provides a method to find the linear structures. If we have a suf-
ficiently large subset H of Nf , we can get U
i
f by solving the system of lin-
ear equations {a · ω = i|ω ∈ H}. (Here, solving the system of linear equations
{a · ω = i|ω ∈ H} means finding vector a that satisfies a · ω = i for all ω ∈ H.)
Next we consider the vector functions. Suppose m,n are positive integers. Cm,n
denotes the set of all functions from Fm2 to Fn2 . The linear structure of a vector
function in Cm,n can be defined similarly:
Definition 5 A vector a ∈ Fm2 is called a linear structure of a vector function
F ∈ Cm,n, if there exists a vector α ∈ {0, 1}n such that
F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) = α, ∀x ∈ {0, 1}m.
Suppose F = (F1, F2, · · · , Fn). A straightforward way to find the linear struc-
tures of F is to first search for the linear structures of each component function Fj
respectively and then take the intersection. Let UF be the set of all linear struc-
tures of F , and UαF = {a ∈ Fn2 |F (x ⊕ a) ⊕ F (x) = α, ∀x}. It is obviously that
UF = ∪αUαF . The relative differential uniformity of F is defined as
δF =
1
2m
max
0 6=a∈Fm2
max
α∈Fn2
|{x ∈ Fm2 |F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) = α}|,
which quantifies how close F is from having a nontrivial linear structure.
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3 Finding linear structures via Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm
In this section we briefly recall the BV algorithm [2] and introduce how to use it
to find the linear structures of a Boolean function. The goal of BV algorithm is to
determine a secret string a ∈ {0, 1}n. Specifically, suppose
f(x) = a · x =
n∑
i=1
aixi.
The algorithm aims to determine a, given the access to an quantum oracle which
computes the function f . It works as follows:
1. Prepare the initial state |ψ0〉 = |0〉⊗n|1〉, then perform the Hadamard trans-
form H(n+1) on it to obtain the quantum superposition
|ψ1〉 =
∑
x∈Fn2
|x〉√
2n
· |0〉 − |1〉√
2
.
2. A quantum query to the oracle which computes f maps it to the state
|ψ2〉 =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)|x〉√
2n
· |0〉 − |1〉√
2
.
3. Apply the Hadamard gates H(n) to the first n qubits again yielding
|ψ3〉 =
∑
y∈Fn2
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)+y·x|y〉,
where we omit the last qubit for the simplicity. If f(x) = a · x, we have
|ψ3〉 =
∑
y∈Fn2
(
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)(a⊕y)·x)|y〉
=
∑
y∈Fn2
δa(y)|y〉
= |a〉,
where δa(y) = 1 if y = a, otherwise δa(y) = 0. Then by measuring |ψ3〉 in the
computational basis, we will get a with probability 1.
If we run the BV algorithm on a general function f ∈ Bn, the output before
the measurement can be expressed as
|ψ3〉 =
∑
y∈Fn2
Sf (y)|y〉,
where Sf (·) is the Walsh spectrum of f . When we measure the above state in the
computational basis, we will obtain y with probability Sf (y)
2. In other words, we
will always get y ∈ Nf when we run the BV algorithm on f . This fact combined
with Lemma 2 implies a way to find the linear structures.
Now we state the quantum algorithm proposed in [16] for finding the linear
structures of a Boolean function. Roughly speaking, the BV algorithm is treated
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as a subroutine. By repeating the subroutine until one gets a subset H of Nf , and
then solving the system of linear equations {x · ω = i|ω ∈ H} for both i = 0 and
1, one will get candidate linear structures of f .
Algorithm 1
Let p(n) be an arbitrary polynomial function of n. Φ denotes the null set.
Initialize the set H := Φ.
1 For p = 1, 2, · · · , p(n), do
2 Run the BV algorithm with queries on the quantum oracle of f to get
an n-bit output ω ∈ Nf .
3 Let H = H ∪ {ω}.
4 end
5 Solve the system of linear equations {x · ω = i|ω ∈ H} to get solution Ai
for i = 0, 1 respectively.
6 If A0 ∪A1 ⊆ {(0, · · · , 0)}, then output “No” and halt.
7 Else, output A0 and A1.
To justify the validity of the above algorithm, we present following two theo-
rems, where the Theorem 1 is proved in [16] and the Theorem 2 hasn’t been proved
before.
Theorem 1 If running Algorithm 1 on a function f ∈ Bn gives sets A0 and A1,
then for all a ∈ Ai (i = 0, 1), all  satisfying 0 <  < 1, we have
Pr
[
1− |{x ∈ F
n
2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|
2n
< 
]
> 1− exp(−2p(n)2). (1)
This theorem is proved in [16], and we present the proof in Appendix A for
the paper to be self-contained.
For arbitrary function f ∈ Bn, we let
δ′f =
1
2n
max
a∈Fn2
a/∈Uf
max
i∈F2
|{x ∈ Fn2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|.
It is obviously that δ′f < 1. And if δf < 1, it holds that δ
′
f = δf . By the definition
of δ′f , we can see that the smaller δ
′
f is, the better for ruling out the vectors which
are not linear structures of f during executing Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2 Suppose δ′f ≤ p0 < 1 and Algorithm 1 makes quantum queries for
p(n) = cn times. Then it holds that
1.If δf < 1, that is, f has no nonzero linear structure, then Algorithm 1 returns
“No” with probability greater than 1− pcn0 ;
2.If Algorithm 1 returns A0 and A1, then for any a /∈ U if (i = 0, 1),
Pr[a ∈ Ai] ≤ pcn0 .
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Proof . We first prove the second conclusion. Without loss of generality, we suppose
i = 0. The case where i = 1 can be proved by similar way. If a /∈ U0f , then
according to Lemma 2 there exists a vector ω ∈ Nf such that ω · a = 1. Let
K = {ω ∈ Nf |ω · a = 1}. If the cn times of running BV algorithm ever gives
a vector ω ∈ K, then a /∈ A0. Let W denote the random variable obtained by
running BV algorithm, then
Pr[W ∈ K] =
∑
a·ω=1
Sf (ω)
2
= 1− |V
0
f,a|
2n
≥ 1− p0.
The second formula holds due to Lemma 1. Therefore,
P [a ∈ A0] = [1− P (W ∈ K)]cn
≤ pcn0 ,
which completes the proof of the second conclusion. By observing that δf < 1
means there is no nonzero vector in Uf , the first conclusion can be naturally
derived from the second one.

Suppose l(n) is an arbitrary polynomial of n. Theorem 1 implies that after
p(n) = O(l(n)2n) queries, all vectors in A0 and A1 will be 1l(n) -close linear struc-
tures of f except a negligible probability. In other words, Algorithm 1 is very
likely to output the high probability differentials of f . Theorem 2 shows that if f
has no linear structure, Algorithm 1 with O(n) queries will output “No” except
a negligible probability. In addition, if Algorithm 1 returns sets A0 and A1, then
each vector in Ai will be linear structure of f with overwhelming probability. (The
probability of a event happening is said to be overwhelming if it happens except
a negligible probability.)
4 Linear structure attack
In this section, we first improve the Algorithm 1 so that it can find the linear
structures of a vector function. Afterwards, we use the new algorithm to construct
quantum distinguishers for the 3-round Feistel scheme and recover partial key of
Even-Mansour construction respectively. Since our attack strategy is based on the
linear structures of some constructed functions, we call it linear structure attack.
4.1 Attack algorithm
Suppose F = (F1, F2, · · · , Fn) ∈ Cm,n. A straightforward way to find the linear
structures of F is to apply Algorithm 1 to each component function Fj respectively
and then choose a public linear structure. Specifically, we have following algorithm:
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Algorithm 2
The access to the quantum oracle of F = (F1, · · · , Fn) is given. p(n) is an
arbitrary polynomial function of n.
1 For j = 1, 2, · · · , n, do
2 Run Algorithm 1 with p(n) queries on Fj to get A
0
j and A
1
j .
3 If Algorithm 1 outputs “No”, then output “No” and halt.
4 Else let Aj = A
0
j ∪A1j .
4 end
5 If A1 ∩ · · · ∩An ⊆ {(0, · · · , 0)}, Then output “No” and halt.
6 Else choose an arbitrary nonzero vector a ∈ A1 ∩ · · · ∩ An and output
(a, i1, · · · , in), where i1, · · · , in is the superscript such that a ∈ Ai11 ∩ Ai22
∩ · · · ∩Ainn .
For any function F = (F1, · · · , Fn), let δ′F = max1≤j≤n δ′Fj . The following
theorem justifies the validity of the Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3 Suppose F ∈ Cm,n. Running Algorithm 2 with cn2 queries (p(n) =
cn) on F gives “No” or some vector. It holds that
1.If δ′F ≤ p0 < 1 and F has no linear structure, then Algorithm 2 returns “No”
with probability greater than 1− pcn0 .
2.If δ′F ≤ p0 < 1, then for any a /∈ U (i1,··· ,in)F , we have
Pr[Algorithm 2 returns (a, i1, · · · , in)] ≤ pcn0 .
3.If (a, i1, · · · , in) is obtained by running Algorithm 2, then for any 0 <  < 1,
Pr[
|{x ∈ Fm2 |F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) = i1 · · · in}|
2m
> 1− n] > (1− exp(−2p(n)2))n. (2)
Proof . By observing the fact that a ∈ U (i1,··· ,in)F if and only if for all j = 1, · · · , n,
a ∈ U ijFj , the first two conclusion can be naturally derived from the Theorem 2.
According to Theorem 1, we have
|{x ∈ Fm2 |Fj(x⊕ a)⊕ Fj(x) = ij}|
2m
> 1− , ∀j = 1, · · · , n (3)
holds with a probability greater than (1 − exp(−2p(n)2))n. If the equation (3)
holds, then the number of x satisfying
Fj(x⊕ a) + Fj(x) = ij (4)
for both j = 1 and j = 2 is at least 2m[2(1 − ) − 1] = 2m(1 − 2). Similarly, the
number of x satisfying the equation (4) for all j = 1, 2, 3 is at least 2m[(1− 2) +
(1 − ) − 1] = 2m(1 − 3). By induction, the number of x satisfying (4) for all
j = 1, · · · , n is at least 2m(1− n). Thus the probability that
|{x ∈ Fm2 |F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) = i1 · · · in}|
2m
> 1− n
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Fig. 1: Three-round Feistel scheme
holds is greater than (1− exp(−2p(n)2))n. Thus the third conclusion holds.

Note that Algorithm 2 actually requires that the adversary has the oracle
access to each component function of F . About the efficiency, since Algorithm 2
needs to find the intersection of the sets Aj
′s, its complexity depends on the size
of these sets, which relies on the properties of the specific function F . However,
we can prove that only polynomial time of computation is needed when Algorithm
2 is applied to 3-round Feistel scheme or Even-Mansour construction. In [11,14,
15,21], the authors use Simon’s algorithm to find the period of some constructed
functions and then break the security of 3-round Feistel scheme or Even-Mansour
construction. Compared with Simon’s algorithm, the complexity of Algorithm 2
is a little larger because it needs to search linear structures of each component
function respectively. However, Algorithm 2 has more general applications. It can
find not only the periods of a function but also its other linear structures, which
allows us to construct multiple distinguishers for 3-round Feistel scheme. And in
the section 5 we will see that such way of finding linear structures by considering
each component function respectively may bring some unexpected advantages for
differential cryptanalysis.
4.2 Application to a three-round Feistel scheme
A Feistel scheme is a classical construction to build block ciphers. A 3-round
Feistel scheme with input (xL, xR) and output (yL, yR) is built from three random
functions P1, P2, P3 as shown in Figure 1, where xL, xR, yL, yR ∈ {0, 1}n. It’s
proved that a 3-round Feistel scheme is a secure pseudorandom permutation as long
as the internal functions are pseudorandom as well [18]. Our goal is to construct a
quantum distinguisher which distinguishes a 3-round Feistel scheme from a random
permutation on {0, 1}2n.
Suppose s0, s1 ∈ Fn2 are two arbitrary constants such that s0 6= s1. We define
the following function:
F : F2 × Fn2 → Fn2
( b , x )→ P2(x⊕ P1(sb)). (5)
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Given the oracle access of the 3-round Feistel function E, it is easy to construct
the oracle OF which computes F on superpositions. Observing that the right part
of the output E(sb, x) is F (b, x) ⊕ sb, we can construct the oracle OF by first
querying the oracle which computes the right part of E, then applying the unitary
operator: Us0,s1 : |b〉|c〉 → |b〉|c ⊕ sb〉. For every (b‖x) ∈ Fn+12 , it is easy to check
that
F (b, x) = F (b⊕ 1, x⊕ P1(s0)⊕ P1(s1)).
Thus (1‖s) , (1‖P1(s0) ⊕ P1(s1)) is a nonzero linear structure of F , or more
accurately, (1‖s) ∈ U (0,··· ,0)F . Therefore, by running Algorithm 2 on F one can get
(1‖s). On the other hand, the probability of a random function having a linear
structure is negligible. Given the access to a quantum oracle which computes the 3-
rounds Feistel function E or a random permutation over {0, 1}2n, we can construct
the distinguishing algorithm as below:
Algorithm 3
Let p(n) = n+ 1 and initialize the set H := Φ.
1 Choose s0, s1 ∈ Fn2 , s.t. s0 6= s1. Then define function F = (F1, · · · , Fn) as
equation (5).
2 For j = 1, · · · , n do
3 For p = 1, · · · , p(n), do
4 Run BV algorithm on Fj to get an output ω ∈ NFj .
5 Let H = H ∪ {ω}
6 End
7 Solve the system of linear equations {x ·ω = 0|ω ∈ H} to get the solution
A0j .
8 If A0j ⊆ {(0, · · · , 0)}, then output “No” and halt.
9 Else Let H = Φ.
10 End
11 If A01 ∩ · · · ∩A0n+1 ⊆ {(0, · · · , 0)}, then output “No” and halt.
12 Else choose an arbitrary nonzero vector a ∈ A01 ∩ · · · ∩A0n+1. And choose
an (n+1)-bit string u uniformly at random. Let u′ = u⊕a. Make classical
queries for u and u′.
13 If F (u) = F (u′), Then output “Yes”.
14 Else, output “No”.
Before analyzing the validity and efficiency of Algorithm 3, we first give fol-
lowing lemma:
Lemma 3 Suppose F = (F1, · · · , Fn) is defined as equation (5). Then for all
j = 1, 2, · · · , n,
δFj (1‖s) ,
1
2n+1
max
(τ,t)∈Fn+12
(τ,t)/∈{(0,··· ,0),(1‖s)}
|{(b, x) ∈ Fn+12 |Fj(b, x) = Fj(b⊕ τ, x⊕ t)}| ≤
2
3
holds except a negligible probability. Here, δFj (1‖s) is still a random variable since
Fj is determined by random functions P1, P2.
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Proof . If δFj (1‖s) > 23 , then there exists (τ, t) /∈ {0, (1‖s)} such that |{(b, x) ∈
Fn+12 |Fj(b, x) = Fj(b⊕ τ, x⊕ t)}| > 23 · 2n+1. If τ = 0, this implies
|{x ∈ Fn2 |Fj(0, x) = Fj(0, x⊕ t)}| >
2
3
· 2n or |{x ∈ Fn2 |Fj(1, x) = Fj(1, x⊕ t)}| >
2
3
· 2n.
Thus there exists some b such that
|{x ∈ Fn2 |P2j(x⊕ P1(sb)) = P2j(x⊕ t⊕ P1(sb))}| > 2
3
· 2n,
where P2j is the j
th component function of P2. That is,
|{x ∈ Fn2 |P2j(x) = P2j(x⊕ t)}| > 2
3
· 2n.
Similarly, if τ = 1, we have
|{x ∈ Fn2 |P2j(x) = P2j(x⊕ t⊕ P1(s0)⊕ P1(s1))}| > 2
3
· 2n.
Anyway, there exists a u 6= (0, · · · , 0) such that
|{x ∈ Fn2 |P2j(x) = P2j(x⊕ u)}| > 2
3
· 2n. (6)
Since P2 is a random function, P2j is actually a random Boolean function. Thus,
|{x ∈ Fn2 |P2j(x) = P2j(x ⊕ u)}| is still a random variable. We next prove that
equation (6) holds only with a negligible probability. This will imply that the
probability of δFj (1‖s) > 23 is negligible, and thus completes the proof.
The rest is to prove the probability
Pr[
|{x ∈ Fn2 |P2j(x) = P2j(x⊕ u)}|
2n
>
2
3
]
is negligible, where P2j is uniformly chosen from the set of all Boolean functions
from Fn2 to F2. We call an unordered set of two vectors in Fn2 a pair. For example,
vectors x, y form a pair {x, y}, and {x, y} = {y, x}. The difference of a pair {x, y}
is defined as x ⊕ y. For the nonzero difference u, there are 2n−1 pairs with this
difference. Thus, ∣∣{x ∈ Fn2 |P2j(x) = P2j(x⊕ u)}∣∣
=
∣∣{(x, y) ∈ Fn2 × Fn2 |P2j(x) = P2j(y), x⊕ y = u}∣∣
=2
∣∣{{x, y}|P2j(x) = P2j(y), x⊕ y = u}∣∣. (7)
For convenience, we denote the 2n−1 pairs with difference u as {x1, x1⊕u}, {x2, x2⊕
u}, · · · , {x2n−1 , x2n−1⊕u}. Let Zl = P2j(xl)⊕P2j(xl⊕u)⊕1 for l = 1, 2, · · · , 2n−1.
Since P2j is random Boolean function and for l 6= k, {xl, xl⊕u}
⋂{xk, xk⊕u} = Φ,
Z1, · · · , Z2n−1 are independent and identically distributed random variables. They
all follow the uniform distribution over {0, 1}. That is, Pr[Zl = 0] = Pr[Zl = 1] =
1
2 , l = 1, 2, · · · , 2n−1. According to Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr[
1
2n−1
2n−1∑
l=1
Zl − 1
2
≥ 1
6
] ≤ 2 exp(− 1
18
2n−1).
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That is,
Pr[
2n−1∑
l=1
Zl ≥ 2
3
· 2n−1] ≤ 2 exp(− 1
18
2n−1).
Since
2n−1∑
l=1
Zl =
∣∣{Zl|Zl = 1}∣∣
=
∣∣{ {xl, xl ⊕ u} |P2j(xl)⊕ P2j(xl ⊕ u)⊕ 1 = 1}∣∣
=
∣∣{ {x, y} |P2j(x) = P2j(y), x⊕ y = u}∣∣,
we have
Pr
[ ∣∣{ {x, y} |P2j(x) = P2j(xy), x⊕ y = u}∣∣ ≥ 2
3
· 2n−1
]
≤ 2 exp(− 1
18
2n−1).
According to equation (7), we have
Pr
[ |{x ∈ Fn2 |P2j(x) = P2j(x⊕ u)}|
2n
>
2
3
]
≤ 2 exp(− 1
18
2n−1).
Therefore, equation (6) holds with a negligible probability.

About the validity of Algorithm 3, we have following theorem:
Theorem 4 Algorithm 3 successfully distinguishes the 3-round Feistel function
from a random permutation except a negligible probability.
Proof . If the given oracle computes a random permutation, the string a obtained
during executing Algorithm 3 is random if exists. Hence the probability of F (u)
being equal to F (u′) is approximate to 12n . On the other hand, if the given oracle
computes the 3-round Feistel function, then
δFj (1‖s) ,
1
2n+1
max
(τ,t)∈Fn+12
(τ,t)/∈{(0,··· ,0),(1‖s)}
|{(b, x) ∈ Fn+12 |Fj(b, x) = Fj(b⊕ τ, x⊕ t)}| ≤
2
3
holds with a overwhelming probability according to Lemma 3. Due to Theorem 2,
above equation indicates
Pr[a 6= (1‖s)] ≤ (2
3
)n+1.
Thus the probability that F (u) 6= F (u′) is no more than (23 )n+1, which completes
the proof.

Note that Algorithm 3 actually requires that the attacker can query each com-
ponent function of the right part of E. Then we consider the efficiency of Algorithm
3. If the given oracle computes the 3-round Feistel function, according to Lemma
3 and Theorem 2, for any a /∈ {(0, · · · , 0), (1‖s)}, we have Pr[a ∈ A0j ] ≤ (23 )n+1.
Thus with a overwhelming probability, A0j contains only 0 and (1‖s). Therefore,
finding the intersection of A0j
′s almost needs no calculation. It is also true when
given oracle computes a random permutation. In addition, Algorithm 3 queries
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quantum oracle for n(n+ 1) times and classical oracle for 2 times. Thus the com-
plexity of Algorithm 3 is O(n2). The distinguishing algorithm used in [11,14,21]
is based on Simon’s algorithm and its complexity is only O(n), which is better
then ours. But our algorithm provides a new and inspirational approach to attack
block ciphers. And by using our attack strategy, one can find more than one dis-
tinguisher. For example, we can also define F (b, x) = P2(x⊕ P1(sb))⊕ (b, · · · , b).
Then F has the linear structure (1‖P1(s0) ⊕ P1(s1)) ∈ U (1,··· ,1)F , and we can use
it to construct another quantum distinguisher by similar way.
4.3 Application to the Even-Mansour construction
The Even-Mansour construction is a simple scheme which builds a block cipher
from a public permutation [7]. Suppose P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a permutation,
the encryption function is defined as
Ek1,k2 = P (x⊕ k1)⊕ k2,
where k1, k2 are the keys. Even and Mansour have proved that this construction is
secure in the random permutation model up to 2n/2 queries. However, Kuwakado
and Morii proposed a quantum attack which could recover the key k1 based on
Simon’s algorithm. Our attack strategy is similar with theirs, we use BV algorithm
instead of the Simon’s algorithm.
In order to recover the key k1, we first define the following function:
F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
x→ Ek1,k2(x)⊕ P (x).
Given the oracle access of Ek1k2(·), it is easy to construct the oracle OF which
computes F on superpositions. Since F (x) ⊕ F (x ⊕ k1) = 0 for all x ∈ Fn2 , k1 is
a linear structure of F , or more accurately, k1 ∈ U (00···0)F . Therefore, by running
Algorithm 2 on F with minor modification we can obtain k1. Specifically, following
algorithm can recover k1 with a overwhelming probability.
Algorithm 4
The oracle access of F = (F1, · · · , Fn) is given. Let p(n) be an arbitrary
polynomial function of n, and initialize the set H := Φ.
1 For j = 1, 2, · · · , n, do
2 For p = 1, · · · , p(n), do
3 Run the BV algorithm on Fj to get a n-bit output ω ∈ NFj .
4 Let H = H ∪ {ω}.
5 End
6 Solve the system of linear equations {x · ω = 0|ω ∈ H} to get A0j .
7 If A0j ⊆ {(0, · · · , 0)},then output “No” and halt.
8 Else, Let H = Φ.
9 End.
10 If A01 ∩ · · · ∩A0n ⊆ {(0, · · · , 0)}, then output “No” and halt.
11 Else choose an arbitrary nonzero a ∈ A01 ∩ · · · ∩A0n and output a.
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Theorem 5 Running Algorithm 4 with n2 (p(n) = n) queries on F gives the key
k1 except a negligible probability.
Proof . By the similar proof of Lemma 3, we can obtain that for j = 1, · · · , n
δFj (k1) ,
1
2n
max
α∈Fn2
α/∈{(o,··· ,0),k1}
|{x ∈ Fn2 |Fj(x) = Fj(x⊕ α)}| ≤ 2
3
(8)
holds except a negligible probability. Here, δFj (k1) is still a random variable since
Fj is determined by random functions P1, P2. Equation (8) indicates that
δ′F = max
j
δ′Fj ≤
2
3
holds except a negligible probability. Then according to Theorem 3, the probability
that Algorithm 4 outputs k1 is greater than 1− (23 )n, which completes the proof.

About the complexity of Algorithm 4, according to the equation (8) and Theo-
rem 2, the probability of A0j containing the vectors apart from k1 and 0 is negligi-
ble. Thus finding the intersection of A0j
′s almost needs no calculation. In addition,
Algorithm 4 needs to query quantum oracle for n2 times. Thus its complexity is
O(n2).
5 Differential cryptanalysis
In this section, we look at the linear structures from another view: the differentials
of a encryption function. Based on this, we give three ways to execute differential
cryptanalysis, which we call quantum differential cryptanalysis, quantum small
probability differential cryptanalysis and quantum impossible differential crypt-
analysis respectively. Unlike the classical differential cryptanalysis, the success
probability of the first two methods is related to the key used for encryption al-
gorithm. Specifically, suppose q(n) is an arbitrary polynomial. For the first two
methods, we can execute the corresponding attack algorithms properly so that
they work for at least (1 − 1q(n) ) of the keys in the key space. While the third
method works for all keys in the key space.
5.1 Quantum differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen-plaintext attack. Suppose E : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n is the encryption function of a r-round block cipher. Let Fk be the function
which maps the plaintext x to the input y of the last round, where k denotes the
key of the first r − 1 rounds. Let Fk(x) = y, Fk(x′) = y′, then ∆x = x ⊕ x′ and
∆y = y⊕ y′ are called the input difference and output difference respectively. The
pair (∆x,∆y) is called a differential. Differential cryptanalysis is composed by two
phases. In the first phase, the attacker tries to find a high probability differential
of Fk. In the second phase, according to the high probability differential that has
been found, the attacker tests all possible candidate subkeys and then recover the
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key of the last round. Our algorithm is applied in the first phase, while a quantum
algorithm is applied in the second phase in [24].
Intuitively, we can use Algorithm 2 to find the high probability differentials of
Fk. However, there exists a problem that the oracle access of Fk is not available.
The attacker can only query the whole encryption function E. In classical differen-
tial cryptanalysis, the attacker analyzes the properties of the encryption algorithm
and searches for the high probability differentials that is independent of the key,
i.e. the differentials that always have high probability no matter what the key is.
We try to apply the same idea to our attack. But unfortunately, we still haven’t
found a way to obtain the key-independent high probability differentials of Fk
using BV algorithm. However, we can modify Algorithm 2 to find the differentials
that have high probability for the most of keys. To do this, we treat the key as
a part of the input of the encryption function and run Algorithm 2 on this new
function. Specifically, suppose m be the length of the key in the first r− 1 rounds
and K = {0, 1}m be corresponding key space. Define the following function
G : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n
(x , k) → Fk(x).
G is deterministic and known to the attacker. Thus the oracle access of G is avail-
able. (Actually, the oracle access of each Gj is available.) By executing Algorithm
2 on G, one is expected to obtain a high probability differential of G with over-
whelming probability. But in order to make it also the differential of Fk, the last
m bits of the input difference, which corresponds to the difference of the key, needs
to be zero. To do this, we modify the Algorithm 2 slightly as below:
Algorithm 5
The oracle access of G = (G1, · · · , Gn) is given. Let p(n) be an arbitrary
polynomial function of n, and initialize the set H := Φ.
1 For j = 1, 2, · · · , n, do
2 For p = 1, · · · , p(n), do
3 Run the BV algorithm on Gj to get a (n + m)-bit output ω =
(ω1, · · · , ωn, ωn+1, · · · , ωn+m) ∈ NGj .
4 Let H = H ∪ {(ω1, · · · , ωn)}.
5 End
6 Solve the system of linear equations {x · ω = ij |ω ∈ H} to get the set
A
ij
j for ij = 0, 1, respectively.
7 If Aj , A0j ∪A1j ⊆ {(0, · · · , 0)}, then output “No” and halt.
8 Else, Let H = Φ.
9 End.
10 If A1 ∩ · · · ∩An ⊆ {(0, · · · , 0)}, then output “No” and halt.
11 Else choose an arbitrary nonzero vector a ∈ A1 ∩ · · · ∩ An and output
(a, i1, · · · , in), where i1, · · · , in is the superscript such that a ∈ Ai11 ∩ Ai22
∩ · · · ∩Ainn .
By running Algorithm 5, one can find a differential of Fk that has high prob-
ability for the most of keys. Specifically, we have following theorem:
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Theorem 6 Suppose q(n) is an arbitrary polynomial of n. If running Algorithm
5 with np(n) quantum queries on G gives a vector (a, i1, · · · , in), then there exist
a subset K′ ⊆ K such that |K′|/|K| ≥ 1− 1q(n) and for all k ∈ K′, it holds that
Pr
[ |{x ∈ Fn2 |Fk(x⊕ a)⊕ Fk(x) = i1, · · · , in}|
2n
> 1− 
]
>
(
1− exp(− 2p(n)
2
q(n)2n2
)
)n
.
Proof . Since a · (ω1, · · · , ωn) = 0 indicates (a‖0, · · · , 0) · (ω1, · · · , ωn+m) = 0, the
vector (a‖0 · · · , 0) can be seen as an output when we execute Algorithm 2 on G.
According to Theorem 3,
|{z ∈ Fn+m2 |G(z ⊕ (a‖0, · · · , 0)⊕G(z) = i1, · · · , in}|
2n+m
> 1− n0 (9)
holds with a probability greater than (1− exp(−2p(n)20))n. Let
V (k) =
|{x ∈ Fn2 |Fk(x⊕ a)⊕ Fk(x) = i1, · · · , in}|
2n
.
Equation (9) indicates Ek(V (k)) > 1 − n0, where Ek(·) means the expectation
when the key k is chosen uniformly at random from K. Therefore, if the equation
(9) holds, for any polynomial q(n), we have
Prk[V (k) > 1− q(n)n0] > 1− 1
q(n)
.
That is, for at least (1− 1q(n) ) of keys in K, it holds that V (k) > 1− q(n)n0. Let
K′ be the set of these keys, then |K′|/|K| ≥ 1 − 1q(n) , and for all k ∈ K′, it holds
that
Pr
[
V (k) > 1− q(n)n0
]
>
(
1− exp(−2p(n)20)
)n
.
The conclusion is obtained by letting  = q(n)n0.

According to Theorem 6, if p(n) = O(n3q(n)2), then for any k ∈ K1 and any
constant c, V (k) > 1 − 1c holds except a negligible probability. For any constant
c1, c2, if p(n) =
1
2c
2
1n
2q(n)2 ln (c2n), then for any k ∈ K1, we have
Pr
[ |{x ∈ Fn2 |Fk(x⊕ a)⊕ Fk(x) = i1, · · · , in}|
2n
> 1− 1
c1
]
> 1− 1
c2
.
When the attacker performs differential cryptanalysis, he or she first chooses con-
stants c1, c2, then executes Algorithm 5 with p(n) =
1
2c
2
1n
2q(n)2 ln (c2n) to obtain
a differential of Fk. The obtained differential has high probability for at least
(1 − 1q(n) ) of keys in K. Afterwards, the attacker determines the subkey in the
last round according to this high probability differential, which can be done as
in classical differential cryptanalysis. To analyze the complexity of Algorithm 5,
we divide it into two parts: running BV algorithm to obtain the sets Aj
′s; and
finding the intersection of Aj
′s. In the first part, Algorithm 5 needs to run BV al-
gorithm for np(n) = O(n2q(n)2 lnn) times. Thus O(n2q(n)2 lnn) quantum queries
are needed. As for the second part, the corresponding complexity depends on the
size of the sets Aj
′s. Suppose t = maxj |Aj |, then the complexity of finding the
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intersection by sort method is O(nt log t). The value of t depends on the property
of the encryption algorithm. Generally speaking, t will not be large since a well
constructed encryption algorithm usually does not have many linear structures. In
addition, one can also choose a greater p(n) to decrease the value of t. Therefore,
the complexity of Algorithm 5 is O(n2q(n)2 lnn).
One of the advantages of our algorithm is that it can find the high probabil-
ity differential directly. While in classical case, the attacker needs to analyze the
partial structures of the encryption algorithm respectively and then seek the high
probability differential characteristics, which may be much more complicated with
the increase of the number of rounds.
5.2 Quantum small probability differential cryptanalysis
In this subsection we present a new way to execute differential cryptanalysis, which
is called quantum small probability differential cryptanalysis. As shown in the pre-
vious sections, the way we find differentials of a vector function is to first search for
the differentials of each component functions respectively, and then choose a public
input difference and output the corresponding differential. Although this method
will slightly increase the complexity of the attack algorithm, it may bring advan-
tages in some applications. Quantum small probability differential cryptanalysis
is such an example. Differential cryptanalysis using small-probability differentials
was considered in [4,13]. In differential analysis, the attacker needs to use the dif-
ferentials with notable statistical properties to distinguish the block cipher from a
random permutation, such as differential cryptanalysis and impossible differential
cryptanalysis. As for the small probability differentials, since any differential of
a random permutation only has a very small probability, the “small-probability”
property of the entire differential cannot be directly used to distinguish the block
cipher from a random permutation. However, if we consider each component func-
tion of the encryption function respectively, it will be possible to execute cryptanal-
ysis based on small-probability differentials. Specifically, let Fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
be the function which maps the plaintext x to the input y of the last round of the
encryption algorithm, and (∆x,∆y) is a differential of Fk with small probability.
For a random permutation P = (P1, · · · , Pn), the differential (∆x,∆y) appears
with probability about 12n . But for the component function Pj , the probability of
the differential (∆x,∆yj) appearing is
1
2 , which is not small at all. Our attack
strategy is based on this fact. The detailed procedure is as follows:
I. Finding small probability differential: Let G(x, k) = Fk(x) as defined
previously and K denote the key space of the first r− 1 rounds. The oracle access
of G is available. The attacker first chooses two polynomials q(n), l(n) of n, then
run Algorithm 5 with np(n) = n4l(n)2q(n)2 ( p(n) = n3l(n)2q(n)2 ) queries on G
to get an output (a, i1, · · · , in). Let b = (i¯1, · · · , i¯n), where i¯j = ij ⊕ 1. Then (a, b)
is a small probability differential of Fk for at least (1− 1q(n) ) of keys in K.
II. Key recovering: Suppose S is the set of all possible subkey of the last
round. For each s ∈ S, we set the corresponding counter Cs to be zero and do as fol-
lows: fix the input difference a, and make 2l(n)2 classical queries on whole encryp-
tion function to get 2l(n)2 ciphers. Then decrypt the last round to obtain l(n)2 out-
put differences ∆y(1), · · · ,∆y(l(n)2) of Fk. Let ∆y(i) = (∆y(i)1 ,∆y(i)2 , · · · ,∆y(i)n ).
For i = 1, · · · , l(n)2 and j = 1, · · · , n, if ∆y(i)j = bj , let the counter Cs = Cs + 1.
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Afterwards, calculate the ratio λs = Cs/nl(n)
2. The attacker chooses the key
s ∈ S which has the smallest ratio λs to be the subkey of the last round.
To justify that above attack procedure work for at least (1 − 1q(n) ) of keys in
K, we give following theorem:
Theorem 7 There exists a subset K1 ⊆ K such that:
(1) |K1|/|K| ≥ 1− 1q(n) ;
(2) If the key used for the first r − 1 rounds of the encryption algorithm is in K1
and s is the right subkey of the last round, then the ratio λs obtained by the above
procedure satisfies
Pr[ λs ≥ 1
l(n)
] ≤ 3 exp(−n/2).
Proof . According to Theorem 1 and the definition of G, for any j = 1, · · · , n,
|{z ∈ Fm+n2 |Gj(z) +Gj(z ⊕ (a‖0)) = bj}|
2m+n
≤  (10)
holds with a probability greater than 1 − exp(−2p(n)2). Similar to the proof of
Theorem 6, we let
Vj(k) =
|{x ∈ Fn2 |Fkj(x⊕ a) + Fkj(x) = bj}|
2n
.
The equation (10) indicates Ek(Vj(k)) ≤ , where Ek(·) means the expectation
when the key k is chosen uniformly at random from K. Therefore, if the equation
(10) holds, we have Prk[Vj(k) ≤ nq(n)] ≥ 1 − 1nq(n) . In other words, for each
j ∈ {1, · · · , n}, Vj(k) ≤ nq(n) holds for at least (1 − 1nq(n) ) of keys in K. Then
by similar analysis in the proof of Theorem 3, for at least (1− 1q(n) ) of keys in K,
it holds that
Vj(k) ≤ nq(n), ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
Let K′ be the set of these keys, then |K′|/|K| ≥ 1 − 1q(n) , and for all k ∈ K′, it
holds that
Pr
[ |{x ∈ Fn2 |Fkj(x⊕ a) + Fkj(x) = bj}|
2n
≤ nq(n)
]
> 1− exp(−2p(n)2)
Let  = 12nl(n)q(n) . Noticing p(n) = n
3l(n)2q(n)2, we have
Pr
[ |{x ∈ Fn2 |Fkj(x⊕ a) + Fkj(x) = bj}|
2n
≤ 1
2l(n)
]
> 1− exp(−n/2). (11)
That is, for all j = 1, · · · , n,
Prx
[
Fkj(x) + Fkj(x⊕ a) = bj
]
≤ 1
2l(n)
(12)
holds except a negligible probability. For i = 1, 2, · · · , l(n)2, j = 1, · · · , n, we define
the random variable
Y (i, j) =

1 ∆y
(i)
j = bj ;
0 ∆y
(i)
j 6= bj .
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For every i, j, the equation (12) indicates Ex(Y (i, j)) ≤ 12l(n) except a negligible
probability. (Here Ex means the expectation when output difference is obtained
by choosing plaintext x uniformly at random. Ex(Y (i, j)) is still a random vari-
able since it is a function of the vector a, which is a random variable output by
Algorithm 5.) According to Hoeffding’s inequality and the fact that the equation
(12) holds except a probability exp(−n/2), it holds that
Pr
[∑
i,j Y (i, j)
nl(n)2
≥ 1
2l(n)
+ δ
]
≤ 2 exp(−2nl(n)2δ2) + exp(−n/2).
Let δ = 12l(n) . Noticing
∑
i,j Y (i, j)/nl(n)
2 = λs, we have
Pr[λs ≥ 1
l(n)
] ≤ 3 exp(−n/2),
which completes the proof.

In key recovering phase, the attacker computes l(n)2 output difference to get
the ratio λs for every s ∈ S. If s is not the right key of the last round, the l(n)2
differentials (a,∆y(i)) can be seen as differentials of a random permutation. Then
the probability of Y (i, j) = 1 is approximate to 12 for every i, j. Therefore, the
expectation of λs is approximate to
1
2 . On the other hand, if s is the right key,
the probability of λs ≥ 1l(n) is negligible according to Theorem 7. This notable
difference makes our attack strategy feasible for at least (1 − 1q(n) ) of keys in K.
About the complexity of the attack procedure, there are n4l(n)2q(n)2 quantum
queries and 2l(n)2 classical queries needed in total.
The basic idea of quantum small probability differential cryptanalysis is simi-
lar to the idea of quantum differential cryptanalysis, that is, using some notable
statistical difference to distinguish a encryption function from a random permu-
tation. The main difference of these two methods is in key recovering phase. In
quantum differential cryptanalysis, the attacker treats the differential as a whole
and records the number of times it appears, while in quantum small probability
differential cryptanalysis, the attacker considers every bit of the output differences
respectively and records the number of times they appear.
5.3 Quantum impossible differential cryptanalysis
Impossible differential cryptanalysis is also a chosen-plaintext attack. Suppose
Fk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and the key space K are defined as before. A differential
(∆x,∆y) is called a impossible differential of Fk if it satisfies that
Fk(x⊕∆x) + Fk(x) 6= ∆y, ∀x ∈ Fn2 .
Impossible differential cryptanalysis is composed by two phases. In the first phase,
the attacker tries to find an impossible differential (∆x,∆y) of Fk. And in the
second phase, the attacker uses the found impossible differential to sieve the subkey
of the last round. Specifically, the attacker fixes the input difference ∆x, and
make classical queries on the whole encryption function to get a certain number
of ciphers. Then for any possible key s of the last round, the attacker uses it
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to decrypt these ciphers and obtains corresponding output differences of Fk. If
∆y appears among these output differences, then the attacker rules out s. Our
algorithm is applied in the first phase.
Let G(x, k) = Fk(x) as defined previously. The oracle access of G is available.
A algorithm to find the impossible differentials of Fk is as follows:
Algorithm 6
The oracle access of G = (G1, · · · , Gn) is given. Let p(n) be an arbitrary
polynomial function of n, and initialize the set H := Φ.
1 For j = 1, 2, · · · , n, do
2 For p = 1, · · · , p(n), do
3 Run the BV algorithm on Gj to get a (n + m)-bit output ω =
(ω1, · · · , ωn, ωn+1, · · · , ωn+m) ∈ NGj .
4 Let H = H ∪ {(ω1, · · · , ωn)}.
5 End
6 Solve the system of linear equations {x · ω = 0|ω ∈ H} to get the set B1
and {x · ω = 1|ω ∈ H} to get the set B0. Let Bj = B0j ∪B1j .
7 If Bj ) {(0, · · · , 0)}, then choose an arbitrary nonzero a ∈ Bj and
output (j, a, ij), where ij is the superscript such that a ∈ Bijj , and halt.
8 Else, Let H = Φ.
9 End.
10 Output “No”.
Suppose the attacker gets (j, a, ij) by running Algorithm 6 with p(n) = O(n).
Let δ′G = max1≤j≤n δ
′
Gj . If δ
′
G ≤ p0 < 1 for some constant p0, then according
to Theorem 2, (a,×, · · · ,×, ij ,×, · · · ,×) will be an impossible differential of Fk
except a negligible probability. Here “×′′ means the corresponding bit can be either
0 or 1. Specifically, we have following theorem:
Theorem 8 If δ′G ≤ p0 < 1 and running Algorithm 6 with np(n) = n2 (p(n) = n)
queries on G gives a vector (j, a, ij), then for any key k ∈ K and any i1, · · · , ij−1,
ij+1, · · · , in ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
Fk(x)⊕ Fk(x⊕ a) 6= (i1, · · · , ij−1, ij , ij+1, · · · , in), ∀x ∈ Fn2 (13)
except a negligible probability. That is, (a, i1, · · · , in) is a impossible differential of
Fk except a negligible probability.
Proof . According to Theorem 2, we have Pr[a ∈ U i¯jGj ] > 1−pn0 . Thus Pr[Gj(z)⊕
Gj(z ⊕ (a‖0)) 6= ij ,∀z ∈ Fm+n2 ] > 1− pn0 . This indicates for all k ∈ K,
Pr[Fkj(x)⊕ Fkj(x⊕ a) 6= ij ,∀x ∈ Fn2 ] > 1− pn0 .
Since the probability that the equation (13) holds is no less than the above prob-
ability, the conclusion holds.

From Theorem 8, we can see that by running Algorithm 6 with O(n2) queries
the attacker may find impossible differentials of Fk. Unlike the other two kinds
of differential cryptanalysis proposed in previous two subsections, the “impossi-
bility” of the found differential holds for all keys in K. But Algorithm 6 can only
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find the impossible differentials whose “impossibility” concentrates on a certain
bit. In other words, only when there exists some j such that Fkj has impossible
differentials, can Algorithm 6 find impossible differentials of Fk. Although our al-
gorithm can only find such special impossible differentials, it still provide a new
and inspirational approach for impossible differential cryptanalysis. In addition,
one of the main shortcomings of traditional impossible differential cryptanalysis
is the difficulties in extending the differential path, which limits the number of
rounds that can be attacked. Our approach does not have this problem since it
treats the first r − 1 rounds as a whole.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we construct new quantum distinguishers for the 3-round Feistel
scheme and propose a new quantum algorithm to recover partial key of Even-
Mansour construction. Afterwards, by observing that the linear structures of a
encryption function are actually high probability differentials of it, we propose
three ways to execute differential cryptanalysis. The quantum algorithms used for
these three kinds of differential cryptanalysis all have polynomial running time.
We believe our work provides some helpful and inspirational methods for quantum
cryptanalysis.
There are many directions for future work. First, is it possible to modify the
algorithms used for quantum differential analysis and quantum small probability
differential cryptanalysis so that they can work for all keys in the key space.
Also, under the premise of not affecting the success probability, how to reduce the
complexity of our attacks is worthy of further study. In addition, all algorithms
proposed in this article find differentials of a vector function by first searching for
the differentials of its component functions respectively. There may exist other
ways that find differentials of a vector function directly.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 1, which can be found in [16]. Theorem 1 is
stated as following:
Theorem 1.If running Algorithm 1 on a function f ∈ Bn gives sets A0 and A1, then for all
a ∈ Ai (i = 0, 1), all  satisfying 0 <  < 1, we have
Pr(1− |{x ∈ F
n
2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|
2n
< ) > 1− exp(−2p(n)2).
Proof . For all a ∈ Ai (i = 0, 1),
Prx[f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i] = |{x ∈ F
n
2 |f(x⊕ a) + f(x) = i}|
2n
=
|V if,a|
2n
.
Let p = |V if,a|/2n and q = 1−p, then p, q ∈ [0, 1]. We define a random variable Y as following:
Y (ω) =
{
0, ω · a = i;
1, ω · a 6= i.
According to Lemma 1, the expectation of Y is E(Y ) = 1 · q = 1 − p. The p(n) times of
running the BV algorithm produce p(n) independent identical random variables Y1, · · · , Yp(n).
By Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr[ q − 1
p(n)
p(n)∑
j=1
Yj ≥  ] ≤ exp(−2p(n)2).
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Note that a ∈ Ai, we have ∑j Yj must be 0 (otherwise there exists some Yj = 1, then a /∈ Ai).
Thus Pr[q ≥ ] ≤ exp(−2p(n)2). This indicates
Pr[1− p < ] = Pr[q < ] > 1− exp(−2p(n)2),
which completes the proof.

